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Abstract
In this paper, we describe a novel proactive recov-
ery scheme based on service migration for long-running
Byzantine fault tolerant systems. Proactive recovery is
an essential method for ensuring long term reliability of
fault tolerant systems that are under continuous threats
from malicious adversaries. The primary benefit of our
proactive recovery scheme is a reduced vulnerability win-
dow. This is achieved by removing the time-consuming
reboot step from the critical path of proactive recovery.
Our migration-based proactive recovery is coordinated
among the replicas, therefore, it can automatically adjust
to different system loads and avoid the problem of ex-
cessive concurrent proactive recoveries that may occur in
previous work with fixed watchdog timeouts. Moreover,
the fast proactive recovery also significantly improves the
system availability in the presence of faults.
Keywords: Proactive Recovery, Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance, Service Migration, Replication, Byzantine Agree-
ment
1 Introduction
We have seen increasing reliance on services provided
over the Internet. These services are expected to be con-
tinuously available over extended period of time (typi-
cally 24x7 and all year long). Unfortunately, the vul-
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nerabilities due to insufficient design and poor imple-
mentation are often exploited by adversaries to cause a
variety of damages, e.g., crashing of the applications,
leaking of confidential information, modifying or delet-
ing of critical data, or injecting of erroneous informa-
tion into the application data. These malicious faults
are often modeled as Byzantine faults [9], and they are
detrimental to any online service providers. Such threats
can be coped with using Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT)
techniques, as demonstrated by many research results
[2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 16]. The Byzantine fault tolerance
algorithms assume that only a small portion of the repli-
cas can be faulty. When the number of faulty replicas
exceeds a threshold, BFT may fail. Consequently, Cas-
tro and Liskov [3] proposed a proactive recovery scheme
that periodically reboots replicas and refreshes their state,
even before it is known that they have failed. As long as
the number of compromised replicas does not exceed the
threshold within a time window that all replicas can be
proactively recovered (such window is referred to as win-
dow of vulnerability [4], or vulnerability window), the in-
tegrity of the BFT algorithm holds and the services being
protected remain highly reliable over the long term.
However, the reboot-based proactive recovery scheme
has a number of issues. First, it assumes that a simple
reboot (i.e., power cycle the computing node) can suc-
cessfully repair a compromised node, which might not be
the case, as pointed out in [15]. Second, even if a com-
promised node can be repaired by a reboot, it is often a
prolonged process (typically over 30s for modern operat-
ing systems). During the rebooting step, the BFT services
might not be available to its clients (e.g., if the reboot-
ing node happens to be a nonfaulty replica needed for the
replicas to reach a Byzantine agreement). Third, there
lacks coordination among replicas to ensure that no more
than a small portion of the replicas (ideally no more than
f replicas in a system of 3f + 1 replicas to tolerate up to
f faults) are undergoing proactive recovery at any given
time, otherwise, the services may be unavailable for ex-
tended period of time. The static watchdog timeout used
in [4] also contributes to the problem because it cannot
automatically adapt to various system loads. The stag-
gered proactive recovery scheme in [4] is not sufficient to
prevent this problem from happening.
In this paper, we present a novel proactive recovery
scheme based on service migration, which addresses all
these issues. Our proactive recovery scheme requires the
availability of a pool of standby computing nodes in addi-
tion to the active nodes where the replicas are deployed.
The basic idea is outlined below. Periodically, the repli-
cas initiate a proactive recovery by selecting a set of ac-
tive replicas, and a set of target standby nodes for a ser-
vice migration. At the end of the service migration, the
source active nodes will be put under a series of preven-
tive sanitizing and repairing steps (such as rebooting and
swapping in a clean hard drive with the original system
binaries) before they are assigned to the pool of standby
nodes, and the target nodes are promoted to the group of
active nodes. The unique feature of this design is that the
sanitizing and repairing step is carried out off the critical
path of proactive recovery and consequently, it has min-
imum negative impact on the availability of the services
being protected.
This paper makes the following research contributions:
• We propose a novel migration-based proactive re-
covery scheme for long-running Byzantine fault tol-
erant systems. The scheme significantly reduces
the recovery time, and hence, the vulnerability win-
dow, by moving the time-consuming replica sanitiz-
ing and repairing step off the critical path.
• Our proactive recovery scheme ensures a coordi-
nated periodical recovery, which prevents harmful
excessive concurrent proactive recoveries.
• We present a comparison study on the performance
of the reboot-based and our migration-based proac-
tive recovery schemes in the presence of faults, both
by analysis and by experiments.
2 System Model
We assume a partially asynchronous distributed system
in that all message exchanges and processing related to
proactive recovery can be completed within a bounded
time. This bound can be initially set by a system ad-
ministrator and can be dynamically adjusted by the re-
covery mechanisms. However, the safety property of the
Byzantine agreement on all proactive recovery related de-
cisions (such as the selection of source nodes and desti-
nation nodes for service migration) is maintained without
any system synchrony requirement.
We assume the availability of a pool of nodes to serve
as the standby nodes for service migration, in addition to
the 3f+1 active nodes required to tolerate up to f Byzan-
tine faulty replicas. The pool size is large enough to repair
damaged nodes while enabling frequent service migration
for proactive recovery. Furthermore, both active nodes
and standby nodes can be subject to malicious attacks (in
addition to other non-malicious faults such as hardware
failures). However, we assume that the rate of success-
ful attacks on the standby nodes is much smaller than that
on active nodes, i.e., the tolerated successful attack rate
on active nodes is determined by the vulnerability win-
dow the system can achieve, and the tolerated successful
attack rate on standby nodes is determined by the repair
time. The allowed repair time can be much larger than
the achievable vulnerability window given a sufficiently
large pool of standby nodes. If the above assumptions are
violated, there is no hope to achieve long-term Byzantine
fault tolerance.
We assume the existence of a trusted configuration
manager, as described in [14, 15], to manage the pool
of standby nodes, and to assist service migration. Exam-
ple tasks include frequently probing and monitoring the
health of each standby node, and repairing any faulty node
detected. We will not discuss the mechanisms used by the
manager to carry out such tasks, they are out of the scope
of this paper.
Other assumptions regarding the system is similar to
those in [4] and they are summarized here. All com-
municating entities (clients, replicas and standby nodes)
use a secure hash function such as SHA1 to compute the
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digest of a message and use the message authentication
codes (MACs) to authenticate messages exchanged, ex-
cept for key exchange messages, which are protected by
digital signatures. For point to point message exchanges,
a single MAC is included in each message, while multi-
cast messages are protected by an authenticator [1]. Each
entity has a pair of private and public keys. The active
and standby nodes each is equipped with a secure copro-
cessor and sufficiently large read-only memory. In these
nodes, the private key is stored in the coprocessor and all
digital signing and verification is carried out by the copro-
cessor without revealing the private key. The read-only
memory is used to store the execution code for the server
application and the BFT framework. We do not require
the presence of a hardware watchdog timer because of the
coordination of migration and the existence of a trusted
configuration manager.
Finally, we assume that an adversary is computational
bound so that it cannot break the above authentication
scheme.
3 Proactive Service Migration
Mechanisms
The proactive service migration mechanisms collectively
ensure the following objectives:
1. To ensure that correct active replicas have a con-
sistent membership view of the available standby
nodes.
2. To determine when to migrate and how to initiate a
migration.
3. To determine the set of source and target nodes for
migration.
4. To transfer a correct copy of the system state to the
new replicas.
5. To notify the clients the new membership after each
proactive recovery.
The first objective is clearly needed because otherwise the
replicas cannot possibly agree on the set of target nodes
for migration. The second and third objectives are crit-
ical to ensure a coordinated periodic proactive recovery.
Replica0
JOIN-REQUEST
Santization
Procedure
Update
Standby Nodes
Membership
Replica 1 Replica 2 Replica 3
Run BFT algorithm for Total Ordering of
JOIN-REQUEST
JOIN-APPROVED
Standby
Node
Figure 1: The protocol used for a standby node to register
with active replicas.
The fourth objective is obviously necessary for the new
replicas to start from a consistent state. The fifth objec-
tive is essential to ensure that the clients know the correct
membership of the server replicas so that they do not ac-
cept messages from possibly faulty replicas that have been
migrated out of active executing duty, and they can send
requests to the new replicas.
3.1 Standby Nodes Registration
Each standby node is controlled by the trusted configu-
ration manager and is undergoing constant probing and
sanitization procedures such as reboot. If the configura-
tion manager suspects the node to be faulty and cannot
repair it automatically, a system administrator might be
called in to manually fix the problem. Each time a standby
node completes a sanitization procedure, it notifies the ac-
tive replicas with a JOIN-REQUEST message in the form of
<JOIN-REQUEST, l, is>σis , where l is the counter value
maintained by the secure coprocessor of the standby node,
is is the identifier of the standby node, and σis is the au-
thenticator. The registration protocol is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.
An active replica accepts the JOIN-REQUEST if it has
not accepted one from the same standby node with the
same or greater l. The JOIN-REQUEST message, once ac-
cepted by the primary, is ordered the same way as a reg-
ular message with a sequence number nr, except that the
primary also assigns a timestamp as the join time of the
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standby node and piggybacks it with the ordering mes-
sages. The total ordering of the JOIN-REQUEST is impor-
tant so that all active nodes have the same membership
view of the standby nodes. The significance of the join
time will be elaborated later in this section.
When a replica executes the JOIN-REQUEST mes-
sage, it sends a JOIN-APPROVED message in the form
of <JOIN-APPROVED, l, nr>σi to the requesting standby
node. The requesting standby node must collect 2f + 1
consistent JOIN-APPROVED messages with the same l and
nr from different active replicas. The standby node then
initiates a key exchange with all active replicas for future
communication.
A standby node might go through multiple rounds of
proactive sanitization before it is selected to run an active
replica. The node sends a new JOIN-REQUEST reconfirm-
ing its membership after each round of sanitization. The
active replicas subsequently updates the join time of the
standby node.
It is also possible that the configuration manager deems
a registered standby node as faulty and it requires a
lengthy repair, in which case, the configuration manager
deregisters the faulty node from active replicas by send-
ing a LEAVE-REQUEST. The LEAVE-REQUEST is handled
by the active replicas in a similar way as that for JOIN-
REQUEST. In the unlikely case that the faulty standby
node has been selected as the new active node, the mech-
anisms react in the following ways: (1) if the migration
is still ongoing when the LEAVE-REQUEST arrives, it is
aborted and restarted with a different set of target standby
nodes, and (2) if the migration has been completed, an
on-demand service migration will be initiated to swap out
the faulty node. The on-demand service migration mech-
anism is rather similar to the proactive migration mecha-
nism, as will be discussed in Section 3.4.
3.2 Proactive Service Migration
When and How to Initiate a Proactive Service Migra-
tion? The proactive service migration is triggered by
the software-based migration timer maintained by each
replica. The timer is reset and restarted at the end of
each round of migration. (An on-demand service migra-
tion may also be carried out upon the notification from
the configuration manager, as mentioned in the previous
subsection.)
How to properly initiate a proactive service migration,
however, is tricky. We cannot depend on the primary to
initiate a proactive recovery because it might be faulty.
Therefore, the migration initiation must involve all repli-
cas.
On expiration of the migration timer, a replica chooses
a set of f active replicas, and a set of f standby nodes,
and multicasts an INIT-MIGRATION request to all other
replicas in the form <INIT-MIGRATION, v, l, S,D, i>σi ,
where v is the current view, l is the migration number (de-
termined by the number of successful migration rounds
recorded by replica i), S is the set of identifiers for the f
active replicas to be migrated, D is the set of identifiers
for the f standby nodes as the targets of the migration, i
is the identifier for the sending replica, and σi is the au-
thenticator for the message.
On receiving an INIT-MIGRATION message, a replica
j accepts the message and stores the message in its data
structure provided that the message carries a valid authen-
ticator, it has not accepted an INIT-MIGRATION message
from the same replica i in view v with the same or higher
migration number, and the replicas in S and D are con-
sistent with the sets determined by itself according to the
selection algorithm (to be introduced next).
Each replica waits until it has collected 2f+1
INIT-MIGRATION messages from different replicas
(including its own INIT-MIGRATION message) be-
fore it constructs a MIGRATION-REQUEST message.
The MIGRATION-REQUEST message has the form
<MIGRATION-REQUEST, v, l, S,D>σp . The primary,
if it is correct, should place the MIGRATION-REQUEST
message at the head of the request queue and order
it immediately. The primary orders the MIGRATION-
REQUEST in the same way as that for a normal request
coming from a client, except that (1) it does not batch the
MIGRATION-REQUEST message with normal requests,
and (2) it piggybacks the MIGRATION-REQUEST and the
2f+1 INIT-MIGRATION messages (as proof of validity of
the migration request) with the PRE-PREPARE message.
The reason for ordering the MIGRATION-REQUEST is to
ensure a consistent synchronization point for migration
at all replicas. An illustration of the migration initiation
protocol is shown as part of Figure 2.
Each replica starts a view change timer when the
MIGRATION-REQUEST message is constructed (just like
when it receives a normal request) so that a view change
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Replica0
Migration Timer Expires
Construct
MIGRATION-REQUEST
upon collecting 2f+1
INIT-MIGRATION
INIT-MIGRATION Init-Migration
Phase
State
Transfer
Phase
To selected
standby
nodes
Replica 1 Replica 2 Replica 3
Run BFT algorithm for Total Ordering of
MIGRATION-REQUEST
Sync-Point
Determination
Phase
MIGRATION-NOW
(with checkpoint)
Figure 2: The proactive service migration protocol.
will be initiated if the primary is faulty and does not order
the MIGRATION-REQUEST message. The new primary, if
it is not faulty, should continue this round of proactive
migration.
In this work, we choose not to initiate a view change
when the primary is migrated if the state is smaller than a
tunable parameter (100KB is used in our experiment). For
larger state (i.e., when the cost of state transfer is more
than that of the view change), the primary multicasts a
VIEW-CHANGE message before it is migrated, similar to
[4].
Migration Set Selection. The selection of the set of ac-
tive replicas to be migrated is relatively straightforward.
It takes four rounds of migration (each round for f repli-
cas) to proactively recover all active replicas at least once.
The replicas are recovered according to the reverse or-
der of their identifiers, similar to that used in [4]. For
example, for the very first round of migration, replicas
with identifiers of 3f, 3f − 1, ..., 2f +1 will be migrated,
and this will be followed by replicas with identifiers of
2f, 2f − 1, ..., f + 1 in the second round, replicas with
identifiers of f, f − 1, ..., 1 in the third round, and finally
replicas with identifiers of 0, 3f, ...2f + 2 in the fourth
round. (The example assumed f > 2. It is straightfor-
ward to derive the selections for the cases when f = 1, 2.)
The selection is deterministic and can be easily computed
based on the migration number. Note that the migration
number constitutes part of middleware state and will be
transfered to all recovering replicas. The selection is in-
dependent of the view the replicas are in.
The selection of the set of standby nodes as the target of
migration is based on the elapsed time since the standby
nodes were last sanitized. That is why each replica keeps
track of the join time of each standby nodes. For each
round of migration, the f standby nodes with the least
elapsed time will be chosen. This is out of consideration
that the probability of these nodes to be compromised at
the time of migration is the least (assuming brute-force
attacks by adversaries).
Migration Synchronization Point Determination. It
is important to ensure all (correct) replicas to use the same
synchronization point when performing the service mi-
gration. This is achieved by ordering the MIGRATION-
REQUEST message. The primary starts to order the
message by sending a PRE-PREPARE message for the
MIGRATION-REQUEST to all backups, as described pre-
viously.
A backup verifies the piggybacked MIGRATION-
REQUEST in a similar fashion as that for the INIT-
MIGRATION message, except now the replica must check
that it has received all the 2f+1 init-migration mes-
sages that the primary used to construct the MIGRATION-
REQUEST, and the sets in S and D match those in
the INIT-MIGRATION messages. The backup requests
the primary to retransmit any missing INIT-MIGRATION
messages. The backup accepts the PRE-PREPARE mes-
sage for the MIGRATION-REQUEST provided that the
MIGRATION-REQUEST is correct and it has not accepted
another PRE-PREPARE message for the same sequence
number in view v. From now on, the replicas executes
according to the three-phase BFT algorithm [4] as usual
until they commit the MIGRATION-REQUEST.
State Transfer. When it is ready to execute the
MIGRATION-REQUEST, a replica i takes a checkpoint of
its state (both the application and the BFT middleware
state), and multicasts a MIGRATE-NOW message to the
f standby nodes selected. The MIGRATE-NOW message
has the form <MIGRATE-NOW, v, n, C, P, i>σi , where
n is the sequence number assigned to the MIGRATION-
REQUEST, C is the digest of the checkpoint, and P con-
tains f tuples. Each tuple contains the identifiers of a
source-node and target-node pair <s, d>. The standby
node d, once completes the proactive recovery procedure,
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assumes the identifier s of the active node it replaces.
A replica sends the actual checkpoint (together with all
queued request messages, if it is the primary) to the target
nodes in separate messages.
If a replica belongs to the f nodes to be migrated, it per-
forms the following additional actions: (1) it stops accept-
ing new request messages, and (2) it reports to the trusted
configuration manager as a candidate standby node. This
replica is then handed over to the control of the configu-
ration manager for sanitization.
Before a standby node can be promoted to run an active
replica, it must collect 2f+1 consistent MIGRATE-NOW
messages with the same sequence number and the digest
of the checkpoint from different active replicas. Once a
standby node obtains a stable checkpoint, it applies the
checkpoint to its state and starts to accept clients’ requests
and participate the BFT algorithm as an active replica.
3.3 New Membership Notification
One can envisage that a fault node might want to continue
sending messages to the active replicas and the clients,
even if it has been migrated, before it is sanitized by
the configuration manager. It is important to inform the
clients the new membership so that they can ignore such
messages sent by the faulty replica. The membership in-
formation is also important for the clients to accept mes-
sages send by new active replicas, and to send messages to
these replicas. This is guaranteed by the new membership
notification mechanism.
The new membership notification is performed in a lazy
manner to improve the performance unless a new active
replica assumes the primary role, in which case, the noti-
fication is sent immediately to all known clients (so that
the clients can send their requests to the new primary).
Furthermore, the notification is sent only by the existing
active replicas (i.e., not the new active replicas because the
clients do not know them yet). Normally, the notification
is sent to a client only after the client has sent a request
that is ordered after the MIGRATION-REQUEST message,
i.e., the sequence number assigned to the client’s request
is bigger than that of the MIGRATION-REQUEST.
The notification message has the form <NEW-
MEMBERSHIP, v, n, P, i>σi (basically the same as the
MIGRATION-NOW message without the checkpoint),
where v is the view in which the migration occurred, and
n is the sequence number assigned to the MIGRATION-
REQUEST, and P contains the tuples of the identifiers
for the replicas in the previous and the new membership.
Note all active replicas should have the information.
When a client collects f + 1 consistent NEW-
MEMBERSHIP messages from different replicas, it up-
dates its state accordingly and starts to accept replies
from, and to send requests to, the new replicas.
3.4 On-Demand Migration
One demand migration can happen when the configura-
tion manager detects a node to be faulty after it has been
promoted to run an active replica. It can also happen
when replicas have collected solid evidence that one or
more replicas are faulty, such as a lying primary. The
on-demand migration mechanism is rather similar to that
for proactive recovery, with only two differences: (1) The
migration is initiated on-demand, rather than by a migra-
tion timeout. However, replicas still must exchange the
INIT-MIGRATION messages before the migration can take
place; (2) The selection procedure for the source node is
omitted because the nodes to be swapped out are already
decided, and the same number of target nodes are selected
accordingly.
4 Benefits of Proactive Service Mi-
gration
4.1 Reduced Vulnerability Window
The primary benefit of using the migration-based proac-
tive recovery is a reduced vulnerability window. The
term vulnerability window (or window of vulnerability)
Tv = 2Tk + Tr is introduced in [4]. Here Tr is the time
elapsed between when a replica becomes faulty and when
it fully recovers from the fault, and Tk is the key refresh-
ment period. As long as no more than f replicas become
faulty during the window of Tv, the invariants for Byzan-
tine fault tolerance will be preserved.
In the reboot-based proactive recovery scheme, the vul-
nerability window T prv is characterized to be 2Tk+T prw +
Rn, as shown in the upper half of Figure 3, where T prw is
the watchdog timeout, Rn is the recovery time for a non-
faulty replica under normal load conditions. The domi-
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Figure 3: Various time intervals used in modelling the
vulnerability windows for the two proactive recovery
schemes.
nating factors for recovery time include Treboot, the re-
boot time, and T prs , the time it takes to save, restore and
verify the replica state. The watchdog timeout T prw is set
roughly to 4Rn to enable a staggered proactive recovery
of f replicas at a time.
The composition of the vulnerability window for the
migration-based proactive recovery is shown in the lower
half of Figure 3. The time intervals specific to migration-
based proactive recovery is labeled by the pm super-
script. Because the migration is coordinated in this recov-
ery scheme, no watchdog timer is used and the term T pmw
is now interpreted as the migration timer, i.e., the time
elapsed between two consecutive rounds of migrations of
f replicas each. This is very different from the watch-
dog timeout T prw , which is statically configured prior to
the start of each replica. Because the recovery time in the
migration-based proactive recovery is much shorter than
that in the reboot-based recovery, and the migration is co-
ordinated, it takes much shorter time to fully recovery all
active replicas once. Hence, Tr can be much shorter for
the migration-based recovery, which leads to a smaller
vulnerability window.
4.2 Increased Availability in the Presence of
Faults
Under fault-free condition, neither the reboot-based nor
the migration-based recovery scheme has much negative
impact to the runtime performance unless the state is very
large, as shown in the experimental data in [4] and in Sec-
tion 5 of this paper. However, in the presence of faulty
nodes, the system availability can be reduced significantly
in the reboot-based proactive recovery scheme, while the
reduction in availability remains small in our migration-
based recovery scheme.
The see the benefit of the migration-based proactive re-
covery regarding the system availability in the presence
of faults, we consider a specific case when the number of
faulty nodes is f and f = 1. While developing a thor-
ough analytical model is certainly desirable, it is out of
the scope of this paper.
We assume that there are f = 1 faulty replica at the
beginning of the set of four rounds of migration to erad-
icate it. (Recall that we assume that at most f replicas
can be compromised in one vulnerability window, which
constitutes four rounds proactive recovery of f replicas
at a time and 2Tk, therefore, it is not possible to end up
with more than f faulty replicas with this assumption.)
We further assume that the proactive recovery rounds af-
ter the removal of the faulty replica has no negative impact
on the system availability, and so does the case when the
faulty replica is recovered in the same round of recovery.
We also ignore the differences between the recovery time
of a normal replica and that of a faulty one.
Since f = 1, the faulty node must be recovered in one
of the four rounds of recovery. Assuming that the faulty
node is chosen randomly, it is recovered in even proba-
bility in either of the four rounds, i.e., Pi = 0.25, where
i = 0, 1, 2, 3. If the faulty replica is recovered in the first
round of recovery, there is no reduction of system avail-
ability q0 (i.e., q0 = 1). If the faulty replica is recov-
ered in round i, where i = 1, 2, 3, the system will not be
available while a replica is recovering during each round
because there will be insufficient number of correct repli-
cas until the recovery is completed, and hence, the system
availability qi in this case will be determined as
qi = Pi
Tv − iRn
Tv
(1)
Therefore, the total system availability is
q =
3∑
i=0
qi = 0.25
3∑
i=0
Tv − iRn
Tv
(2)
For the reboot-based recovery, Rn ≈ Treboot + T prs ,
and for the migration-based recovery, Rn ≈ T pms . It
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the migration-based recovery. (a) With a fixed vulnera-
bility window of 210s and various reboot time. (b) With
fixed recovery time and various vulnerability window set-
tings.
is not unreasonable to assume T prs ≈ T pms because the
network bandwidth is similar to the disk IO bandwidth
in modern general-purpose systems. As shown in Fig-
ure 4(a), the migration-based recovery can achieve much
better system availability if the reboot time Treboot is
large, which is generally the case. Furthermore, as indi-
cated in Figure 4(b), for the range of vulnerability window
considered, the system availability is consistently higher
for the migration-based proactive recovery than that for
the reboot-based proactive recovery.
5 Performance Evaluation
The proactive service migration mechanisms have been
implemented and incorporated into the BFT framework
developed by Castro, Rodriguos and Liskov [2, 3, 4, 5].
Due to the potential large state, an optimization has been
made, similar to the optimization on the reply messages in
the original BFT framework, i.e., instead of every replica
sends its checkpoint to the target nodes of migration, only
one actually sends the full checkpoint. The target node
can verify if the copy of the full checkpoint is correct by
comparing the digest of the checkpoint with the digests
received from the replicas. If the checkpoint is not cor-
rect, the target node asks for a retransmission from other
replicas.
Similar to [4], the performance measurements are car-
ried out in general-purpose servers without hardware co-
processors. The related operations are simulated in soft-
ware. Furthermore, the trusted configuration manager is
not developed as this is one of the no goals of this pa-
per. The motivation of the measurements is to assess the
runtime performance of the proactive service migration
scheme for practical use.
Our testbed consists of a set of Dell SC440 servers con-
nected by a 100 Mbps local-area network. Each server is
equipped with a single Pentium dual-core 2.8GHz CPU
and 1GB of RAM, and runs the SuSE Linux 10.2 opera-
tion system. The micro-benchmarking example included
in the original BFT framework is adapted as the test ap-
plication. The request and reply message length is fixed at
1KB, and each client generates requests consecutively in
a loop without any think time. Each server replica simply
echoes the payload in the request back to the client.
Four active nodes, four standby nodes, and up to eight
client nodes are used in the experiment. This setup can
tolerate a single Byzantine faulty replica. The service mi-
gration interval is set to 70s, corresponding to the mini-
mum possible vulnerability window for a key exchanged
interval of 15s and a maximum recovery time (for a single
replica) of 10s.
To characterize the runtime cost of the service migra-
tion scheme, we measure the recovery time for a single
replica with and without the presence of clients, and the
impact of proactive migration on the system performance
perceived by clients. The recovery time is determined by
measuring the time elapsed between the following two
events: (1) the primary sending the PRE-PREPARE mes-
sage for the MIGRATION-REQUEST, and (2) the primary
receiving a notification from the target standby node in-
dicating that it has collected and applied the latest stable
checkpoint. (The notification message is not part of the
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Figure 5: (a) Service migration latency for different state sizes measured when (1) the replicas are idle (other than the
service migration activity), labeled as “Without Client” and (2) in the presence of one client. (b) The impact of system
load on the migration latency. (c) The impact of proactive migration on system performance (without and with one
crashed replica), as observed by a single client in terms of the number of calls made within one vulnerability window
(70s).
recovery protocol. It is inserted solely for the purpose of
performance measurements.) We refer to this time inter-
val as the service migration latency. The impact on the
system performance is measured at the client by counting
the number of calls it has made during one vulnerability
window, with and without proactive migration-based re-
covery.
The measurement results are summarized in Figure 5.
Figure 5(a) shows the service migration latency for var-
ious state sizes (from 100KB to about 10MB). It is not
surprising to see that the cost of migration is limited by
the bandwidth available (100Mbps) because in our ex-
periment, the time it takes to take a local checkpoint (to
memory) and to restore one (from memory) is negligible.
This is intentional for two reasons: (1) the checkpointing
and restoration cost is very application dependent, and (2)
such cost is the same regardless of the proactive recovery
schemes used.
Furthermore, we measure the migration latency as a
function of the system load in terms of the number of
concurrent clients. The results are shown in Figure 5(b).
As can be seen, the migration latency increases more sig-
nificantly for larger state when the system load is higher.
When there are eight concurrent clients, the migration la-
tency for a state size of 5MB exceeds 10s, which is the
maximum recovery time we assumed in our availability
analysis. This observation suggests the need for dynamic
adjusting of some parameters related to the vulnerability
window, in particular, the watchdog timeout used in the
reboot-based recovery scheme. If the watchdog timeout
is too short for the system to go through four rounds of
proactive recovery (of f replicas at a time), there will be
more than f replicas going through proactive recoveries
concurrently, which will decrease the system availability,
even without any fault. Our migration-based proactive re-
covery does not suffer from this problem. Due to the use
of coordinated recovery, when the system load increases,
the vulnerability window automatically increases.
Figure 5(c) shows the performance impact of proactive
service migration as perceived by a single client. In the
experiment, we choose to use the parameters consistent
with those used in the availability analysis (for migration-
based recovery), i.e., key exchange period of 15s, maxi-
mum recovery time of 10s, and a vulnerability window of
70s. As can be seen, the impact of proactive migration
on the system performance is quite acceptable. For a state
smaller than 1MB, the throughput is reduced only by 10%
or less comparing with the no-proactive-recovery case. In
addition, we have measured the migration performance in
the presence of one (crash) faulty replica (the recovering
recovery is different from the crashed replica). The sys-
tem throughput degradation is similar to that in fault-free
condition. Note that when there are only three correct
replicas, the system throughput is reduced even without
9
proactive migration, as shown in the figure.
6 Related Work
Ensuring Byzantine fault tolerance for long-running sys-
tems is an extremely challenging task. The pioneering
work is carried out by Castro and Liskov. In [4], they
proposed a reboot-based proactive recovery scheme as
a way to repair compromised nodes periodically. The
work is further extended by Rodrigues and Liskov in [15].
They proposed additional infrastructure support and re-
lated mechanisms to handle the cases when a damaged
replica cannot be repaired by a simple reboot. Our work is
inspired by both work. The novelty and the benefits of our
service-migration scheme over the reboot-based proactive
recovery scheme have been elaborated in Section 4.
Other related work includes [12]. In [12], Pallemulle
et al. extended the BFT algorithm to handle replicated
clients and introduced another Byzantine agreement (BA)
step to ensure that all replicated clients receive the same
set of replies. It was claimed that the mechanisms can
also be used to perform online upgrading, which is im-
portant for long-running applications and not addressed
in our work. However, it is not clear if the BA step on the
replies is useful, while incurring significantly higher cost.
If there are more than f compromised server replicas, the
integrity of the service is already broken, in which case,
there is no use for the client replicas to receive the same
faulty reply.
Finally, the reliance on extra nodes beyond the 3f + 1
active nodes in our scheme may somewhat relates to the
use of 2f additional witness replicas in the fast Byzantine
consensus algorithm [10]. However, the extra nodes are
needed for completely different purposes. In our scheme,
they are required for proactive recovery for long-running
Byzantine fault tolerant systems. In [10], however, they
are needed to reach Byzantine consensus in fewer mes-
sage delays.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel proactive recov-
ery scheme based on service migration for long-running
Byzantine fault tolerant systems. We described in detail
the challenges and mechanisms needed for our migration-
based proactive recovery to work. The migration-based
recovery scheme has a number of unique benefits over
previous work, including a smaller vulnerability window
by shifting the time-consuming repairing step out of the
critical recovery path, higher system availability under
faulty conditions, and self-adaptation to different system
loads. We validated these benefits both analytically and
experimentally. For future work, we plan to investigate
the design and implementation of the trusted configura-
tion manager, in particular, the incorporation of the code
attestation methods [6, 8] into the fault detection mecha-
nisms, and the application of the migration-based recov-
ery scheme to practical systems such as networked file
systems.
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